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In the fall of 2017, free kicks began to be considered a real offensive tool.
After his purchase from Benfica, it quickly became clear that Manchester City goalkeeper Ederson possessed a left leg more akin to a catapult than a human limb, capable of launching the ball 80 metres over the opposition defence to create a goal-scoring opportunity.
Teams were baffled by this tactic, as they had never seen it before. City’s entire attacking trio positioned themselves 20 metres beyond the opposition’s goal line, confident that they could not be offside from a goal kick.
@SamLee (@SamLee)
“This set-up of City’s free kick is brilliant. The players are spread out all over the pitch; the opposition have no idea whether the pass will be short, into the big hole in the middle or straight forward. Ederson really changed the game.”
On average, 16 free kicks are taken in a Premier League match, making it the third most common set piece after throw-ins and free kicks.
Until 2017, however, presumably because they start geographically as far away from the opposition’s goal as possible, goal kicks were usually taken haphazardly and without much thought, seen as a necessity to restart the game rather than as a set piece that could be planned and used against the opposition team.
For decades, goal kicks were invariably long and poorly thought out. Then, in the summer of 2019, the IFAB, the body responsible for the laws of the game, changed the rule on goal kicks, stating that the ball no longer had to leave the penalty area of the team taking the goal kick before a player could receive the first pass.
Football has changed the offside rule and VAR has transformed the spectacle, particularly for those watching the games, but the change to the goal-kick rule is the most radical change in the style of play since goalkeepers were banned from receiving back passes in the early 1990s.
There have been some immediate, if expected, changes in behaviour now that the first pass can be controlled anywhere inside the penalty area. The number of short free kicks in the Premier League has risen steadily and is now more than double the figure in 2018-19, when around three-quarters of them were taken from open play.
An additional 44 x 18 metres of space in which to receive the ball may not seem like a revolution, but over the last five years it has played a significant role in accelerating the rise of man-marking, the emptying of midfield and the tactic of playing above the opposition’s pressure.
These are three of the themes highlighted in the UEFA technical observer’s tactical analysis of this summer’s European Championship, exemplified by Slovakia forcing England into a high pressing and almost scoring with a direct play to their striker, and the Netherlands creating a midfield overload against Austria, who pressed hard.
That’s why the scenarios described below – a group of players around the penalty area of the team taking the shot, another just inside the opponent’s half, and a sea of emptiness in between – have become common sights across every major league.
The impact of the rule change has been underestimated by many, Arsene Wenger, the former Arsenal manager and now head of global development at world soccer’s governing body FIFA, said in a review of the rule last year.
“It was introduced to make the game faster and more spectacular, but it has changed even more. The main attraction is to lure the opponent as far away from the goal as possible and try to play. If you can play despite the first pressure, you have the whole half of the pitch to be dangerous. That’s what’s at stake from the beginning.”
But how is it possible that such a trend has started to proliferate in such a short time? And how did it become normal to see a central defender pass the ball to the goalkeeper and vice versa?
It’s a move Arsenal use regularly, with defender Gabriel passing to goalkeeper David Raya before the latter plays a long ball to Kai Havertz up front, and the midfield cavalry launching into supporting runs.
“What happened initially after the rule change was that it was easier to build up the ball because there was no longer a need to play long passes across the box, which gave the pressing team the opportunity to get there first,” says a first-team coach/analyst at a major European club, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak.
“Back then, if the goalkeeper passed the ball to a centre-back, you were stuck on one side of the pitch, whereas now if the defender passed the ball to the goalkeeper, you’re completely central.
“Most teams now bring their midfielders into the box and that makes the space much bigger to defend. It’s so difficult to be compact because if you want to press high, the midfielders have to be on par with the midfielders, which naturally opens up space behind them.
“The question you ask your opponent is, ‘Do you want to press us so much that you end up with three against three or four against four in defence?’ Teams have realised that they need to involve more players to force the pressure, which explains the increase in man-to-man pressure.”
However, every action requires a reaction, and that’s what happened: teams realized they could create false transition moments by isolating their attackers.
“The attacking team’s response was, ‘If you have to play six or seven players in the fourth quarter, we’ll get a goalie who can put the ball over your defense.'” says the coach/analyst himself. “There’s no more space between the lines to be static and move the ball. The concept has changed, leaving large spaces where you want to be free and then arriving at the right time so you can run and your marker has to react.”
One of the most effective teams in the first few seasons after the rule change was Inter, under Antonio Conte. As a manager whose preferred style of football is based on a tried and tested game, Conte capitalized by manipulating the opposition’s setup to give his attackers space to run into.
More recently, the German national team has shown creativity in its use of free kicks and, in friendlies in March this year, demonstrated just how many levels of thinking are involved.
In this example against the Netherlands, goalkeeper Manuel Neuer moves forward with the ball as his midfielders move from the center to drag their markers and open a central passing channel for Havertz. Neuer’s ball is the trigger for the supporting cast to join him, with Havertz’s pass triggering a four-on-four opportunity.
The new rule gave coaches a blank canvas to work with and produced numerous variations on how to try to gain an advantage in the build-up phase.
Southampton manager Russell Martin was one of the coaches who attempted to overhaul the organisation.
A centre-back lines up with the goalkeeper, receives the ball and then waits for the opposition attacker to press before passing the ball to the goalkeeper, who has moved forward 10 metres to act as an extra man, along with another centre-back.
Marseille’s new manager Roberto De Zerbi had the audacity to opt almost exclusively for short free-kicks in his previous job at Brighton & Hove Albion in the Premier League, but experimented even more at his two previous clubs, Sassuolo in Italy and Shakhtar Donetsk in Ukraine.
In his debut 2020-21 season with the latter, he regularly had his team play with four players inside the penalty area, applying pressure before finding the open man after drawing opposition players to one side.
Last season, Hamburg St. Pauli, whose coach Fabian Hurzeler succeeded De Zerbi at Brighton, attempted a series of high-risk drills to secure promotion from Germany’s second division, but the common theme was the goalkeeper’s motivation to run forward with the ball after receiving it from a defender.
This meant that their long kicks went even closer to the opposition’s goal, with the team positioned higher up the pitch competing for a possible second ball.
All these teams have a different approach, as does Liverpool’s new manager, Arne Slot.
However, when his team, Feyenoord, played short with the intention of making their way through the crowd, they did so with much more courage than most.
Here, against NEC Nijmegen in the Dutch top flight earlier this year, Feyenoord ensured goalkeeper Justin Bijlow stayed with the ball and delayed his pass until the last moment, while centre-back Thomas Beelen was instructed to dribble inside his own penalty area and wait for space to present itself.
This is a freer approach, but there are clear risks that come with playing this way inside your own penalty area, as many teams have discovered over the past five years. This is why deception with a pass to the goalkeeper and then a long pass has become the preferred strategy for most elite teams.
Football underwent a significant change five years ago and we are only now beginning to understand how much tactical variety has been possible.
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